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PROTECTING BOTH SIDES OF THE CONVERSATION:
TOWARDS A CLEAR INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR
HATE SPEECH REGULATION
MEERA CHANDRAMOULI*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
represents a wholehearted commitment to an individual’s right to
free expression.1 Historically, the Supreme Court has permitted
the abridgment of that right only in very particular circumstances.
In the majority of its decisions, the Court has adopted a speechprotective stance, prioritizing an individual’s contribution to the
common marketplace of ideas over government intervention.2 The
notion is that the addition of any idea, even if it is disfavored,
outlandish, or small-minded, to society helps to preserve an
atmosphere of robust public debate.3
The international community, in contrast, is warier of the
externalities that accompany unchecked free expression and has, as

* Comments Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol.
34. J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2009, New
York University. I would like to thank the editors of the University of Pennsylvania
Journal of International Law for their tireless efforts. I would also like to thank my
family and friends for their support, humor, and wisdom. All errors are my own.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
2 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”).
3 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (upholding the constitutionality of picketing at a soldier’s funeral and stressing that “[public] speech
cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt”); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (relying on the “bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment . . . that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable” to
invalidate a flag burning statute); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339
(1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”).
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a result, moved towards broader regulation of hate speech,4 or
“speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity or national origin.”5 The reason for this movement stems
in part from a post-World War II notion that characterizes hate
speech not merely as the expression of a viewpoint, but also as an
instrument of subjugation.6 In its desire to equally uphold the
tenets of free expression and freedom from discrimination,
however, the international community has failed to produce an
articulate, comprehensive standard for hate speech regulation.
In this Comment, I will suggest that incorporating frameworks
from U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence into international law
may enhance the precision of the current international standard for
hate speech regulation. In Part 2, I will examine the protections
offered to hate speech in First Amendment jurisprudence in the
United States. In order to understand the American approach to
regulating hate speech, it is necessary to first examine two related
categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection into which
hate speech may fall: words that incite violence and “fighting
words.”7 I will analyze the Court’s treatment of these exceptions in

4 In this comment, I will use the term “hate speech” to denote not only
speech, but also expressive conduct, see, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (holding that
the act of burning the American flag in protest constitutes expressive conduct);
U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (addressing whether the act of burning
draft cards can be “protected ‘symbolic speech’ within the First Amendment”),
and advocacy, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (outlining the current
standard by which the U.S. Supreme Court evaluates governmental regulation of
advocacy that directly incites violence).
5 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003).
6 See, e.g., id. at 1525–26 (emphasizing that, dating to the Holocaust, hateful
and racist propaganda have been used to demean various ethnic groups); Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 336 (1999) (indicating that hate
speech regulation in Germany began as a “complex response to the darkest chapter in German history”); Mariana Mello, Note, Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the
Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary International Law, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 365, 376 (2006) (citing to Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989), for the proposition that hate speech can be a “tool for subordination”).
7 Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (describing fighting words as
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace”).
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its decisions Brandenburg v. Ohio8 and Dennis v. U.S., whose earlier
holding on a similar issue was not completely overruled by
Brandenburg.9 Part 2 will conclude by highlighting the Court’s
continual deference to speech rights, even where the speech is
discriminatory, through an examination of R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul10 and successive decisions.
In Part 3, I will examine the ways in which United Nations
(UN) instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR)11 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),12 as well as international hate speech
jurisprudence, including Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, &
Ngeze or the Media Case following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda13
and other significant decisions in Canada, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Australia, contribute to the current international
standard for hate speech regulation. I will demonstrate that, at
best, international attitudes towards regulating hate speech are
inconsistent and that a precisely articulated standard does not yet
exist in the international community.
In Part 4, I will look to aspects of the hate speech regulation
standard in the United States in order to recommend a more
precise structure for the international standard. To do this, I will
address the factors on which the U.S. Supreme Court relied in

8 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (providing the current standard the U.S. Supreme Court uses in evaluating government regulation of advocacy directly related to violence).
9 Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (distinguishing mere teaching from active advocacy and determining, in that particular instance, that advocating to
overthrow the government was a “clear and present danger” to the government
and thus could not be protected under the First Amendment).
10 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992) (invalidating a biasmotivated Minnesota statute that sought to criminalize the display of a symbol
which “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender” (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)) due
to its overbroad scope and impermissible regulation of speech based on content).
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
13 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence
(Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/
rwmain?docid=404468bc2 (prosecuting the principal members of several Rwandan media outlets for inciting genocide through the transmission of hate speech).
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Brandenburg,14 as well as the portion of the Dennis holding that the
Brandenburg standard does not directly overrule. I will examine
the potential impact of this oversight on international hate speech
regulation. I will ultimately recommend a more consistent
international framework for hate speech regulation that borrows,
in part, from the specificity of the American standard.
2.

CURRENT TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

Freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the
Constitution is a sacred right. Grounds for its protection include
the (1) preservation of diversity of thought and the individual
search for truth in the marketplace of ideas,15 (2) promotion of selfgovernment,16 and (3) encouragement of self-expression and
individual autonomy.17
The primary purpose of the First
Amendment is to prevent the government from suppressing
speech in a way that would inhibit a community’s ability to engage
in the free exchange of ideas. As Justice Jackson eloquently stated
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, “If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”18
As a general matter, the Court has provided broad protection
of individual speech rights, regardless of whether the content of

See infra Part 2.1, notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 60 (1993) (“[I]f any
opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly
know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility.”).
16 See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 245, 263 (1961) (“In my view, ‘the people need free speech’ because they have
decided, in adopting, maintaining and interpreting their Constitution, to govern
themselves rather than to be governed by others.”).
17 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating a New
Hampshire law mandating the display of the state motto on automobile license
plates and in doing so, affirming the First Amendment “right of individuals to
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way
New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable”).
18 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In this decision, the Court noted that in order to fully embrace “intellectual individualism
and . . . cultural diversities,” society must bear the “price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes.” The true “test of [the] substance [of the First Amendment] is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”
Id. at 641–42.
14
15
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the speech is unfavorable.19
Accordingly, the Court has
consistently held that government regulation of pure speech is
justified only if the speech falls within a category that is expressly
unprotected by the First Amendment.20 Precedent dictates that
these categories include, primarily: (1) fighting words,21 (2) true
threats,22 (3) direct incitement,23 (4) obscenity,24 (5) child
pornography,25 and (6) deliberate defamation or libel.26 In other
words, hate speech that directly incites another to violence or that
qualifies as a true threat—that is, speech that puts an individual in
fear of his life or safety27—would likely be proscribable under the

19 U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.”).
20 See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (“There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”).
21 See id. at 572 (holding that some forms of expression have little social value
and do not communicate ideas and are thus not afforded First Amendment protection).
22 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (noting that, although the court
struck down a Virginia statute banning cross burning on its face in this instance, a
state can ban cross burning with intent to intimidate without violating First
Amendment speech protections).
23 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (articulating the principal
that the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press” do not extend to
“advocacy [that] is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action”).
24 See, e.g., Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (outlining the current standard
for identifying obscenity as unprotected expression); Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957) (holding that obscene expression is “utterly without redeeming social
importance”).
25 See N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1942) (“When a definable class of material . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in
its production, . . . the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and . . . it is
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
26 See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (identifying “actual
malice,” or “knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not,” as the standard by which public officials
can recover on defamation or libel claims).
27 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076-77, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a
“true threat” as a “statement which, in the entire context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to
whom the statement is communicated as a serious of intent to inflict bodily harm up-
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First Amendment. On the other hand, the government would not
be justified in banning hate speech due merely to its hateful
content.28 The Court fears that such content-based bans will
encourage future proscription of constitutionally legitimate
speech.29
2.1. Incitement and Hate Speech Under Brandenburg and Dennis
Advocates of restricting hate speech argue that the current U.S.
standard is too speech-protective and that hate speech by its
content alone spurs more hate, which is likely to lead to mass
discrimination and violence.30 In Gitlow v. New York, Justice
Holmes countered that notion by stating that “[e]very idea is an
incitement”31—that, without a more speech-protective standard, all
speech, especially speech that expresses views outside the
mainstream, may be curtailed based merely on its potential to
cause danger.32 The Court’s approach to regulating speech that
incites violence offers insight into when it is appropriate to restrict
hate speech on grounds that hate speech will trigger violent action.
In Brandenburg, the Court outlined the standard by which to
assess the constitutionality of a government restriction on speech

on that person” (emphasis added), and holding that intimidating physicians from
providing reproductive health services was an unconstitutional exercise of the
American Coalition of Life Activists’ First Amendment rights).
28 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392–93 (1992) (holding it impermissible to ban hate speech based merely on its message and stating that the
state had “no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”).
29 See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 215 (1991) (emphasizing the difficulty of determining the precise parameters of racist and homophobic speech and the consequent likelihood that content-based restrictions of hate speech could be overly
broad).
30 See Thomas J. Webb, Verbal Poison—Criminalizing Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis and a Proposal for the American System, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 445-46
(2011) (outlining the potentially destructive effects of hate speech, including “distress, intimidation, and fear,” and noting that “the United States, in effect, has become a safe haven for the promotion of hate speech”).
31 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
32 See Nadine Strossen, Incitement to Hatred: Should There Be a Limit?, 25 S. ILL.
U. L. J. 243, 250 (2001) (detailing historical arguments for restricting speech only in
cases of imminent and substantial danger and explaining how these arguments
shape the current speech-protective standard for hate speech regulation in the
United States).
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that incites violence. In that decision, the Court determined that
speech advocating violence may be proscribed only if the speaker
intends to incite or produce actions that are imminent and
lawless.33 In addition, the speech must be objectively likely to
produce a violation.34 Accordingly, the Court has distinguished
abstract teachings or generalized advocacy to engage in violent
action from speech that is intended to produce an imminent
violation and is likely to do so.35 Consistent with Justice Black’s
dissent in Dennis,36 Brandenburg stands for the proposition that the
mere advocacy of illegal action is not enough to justify the
suppression of speech.37
Even in cases such as NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, where the
speech is especially inflammatory,38 the Court has erred on the side
of protecting individual speech rights.39 The Claiborne Hardware
decision clarifies the Court’s stance on acts of violence within a
mass protest: when a protest, set in a speech-rich context, is
intermingled with isolated incidents of violence or penaltyinducing behavior, only those who commit the acts of violence are
33 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action.”).
34 See id. at 448 (requiring that states distinguish between “the mere abstract
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force
and violence” and “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action” (quoting Noto v. U.S., 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))).
35 Id.
36 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
chief reason for jettisoning the rule is the expressed fear that advocacy of Communist doctrine endangers the safety of the Republic. Undoubtedly, a governmental policy of unfettered communication of ideas does entail dangers. To the
Founders of this Nation, however, the benefits derived from free expression were worth
the risk.”) (emphasis added).
37 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49 (holding that a “statute which fails to
draw this distinction [between mere advocacy of illegal action and advocacy intended to incite imminent lawlessness] impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments”).
38 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (quoting
speaker Charles Evers, with regard to a boycott of white merchants in Mississippi:
“If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna [sic] break
your damn neck.”).
39 See id. at 928 (“An advocate must be free to stimulate his audience with
spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause.”).
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liable for their actions.40
The Court in Claiborne Hardware
determined that the speaker Charles Evers’ speech, regardless of its
tone and message, did not qualify as proscribable incitement under
Brandenburg; instead, it was merely coercive advocacy.41
2.2. A Speech-Protective Framework for Hate Speech Regulation in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Virginia v. Black
The majority in Claiborne Hardware stated that when assessing
the validity of state regulation of individual speech rights under
the First Amendment, the Court should look first for “precision of
regulation.”42 Accordingly, the Court typically assesses hate
speech restrictions with the utmost care, due to the possibility that
they may stymie legitimate speech in the future. The R.A.V. and
Virginia v. Black decisions illustrate this concern. Decided in 1992,
R.A.V. reflects the Court’s standing methodology when analyzing
hate speech restrictions. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance at issue in R.A.V. provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol,
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including,
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.43
The Court, while accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
limiting construction of the statute to reach only fighting words,
40 See id. at 916-18 (emphasizing that the state may impose liability only on
those who engage in violent conduct or who are directly responsible for the consequences of such conduct and not on those who engage in protected speech activity).
41 See id. at 927–28 (indicating that Evers’ speech constituted neither fighting
words under Chaplinsky nor incitement under Brandenburg, and concluding that
“[t]he emotionally charged rhetoric of . . . Evers’ [speech] did not transcend the
bounds of protected speech”).
42 Id. at 916 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). Button further
stands for the proposition that “[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect” and that “precision of regulation” is most important in “area[s] so closely touching [an individual’s] most precious freedoms.” Button, 371
U.S. at 438.
43 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (citing ST. PAUL, MINN.
LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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held the ordinance facially unconstitutional because it sought to
restrict a particular brand of fighting words on the basis of content,
for reasons other than those underlying the decision to strip fighting
words of their constitutional protection in the first place.44 Writing
for the majority, Justice Scalia further clarified the distinction by
supporting the government’s right to “prohibit only that obscenity
which is the most patently offensive in its prurience [or] which
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity,”45 but
refusing to endorse viewpoint-based discrimination46 in speech
regulations.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority in Black followed
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in R.A.V.47 when it held that Virginia
could proscribe cross burning if the actor intended to intimidate
because cross burning is a particularly vicious form of
intimidation.48 It appears then that under the R.A.V.-Black scheme,
the government may proscribe hate speech based on its content
only when it (1) falls into a previously unprotected category under
44 See id. at 391 (concluding that, since “the ordinance applies only to ‘fighting
words’ that insult, or provoke violence ‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender,’” the regulation is “facially unconstitutional” because it seeks to eliminate certain unfavorable viewpoints, as opposed to certain particularly vicious
kinds of fighting words, the regulation is impermissible).
45 Id. at 388.
46 In other words, the government can impose restrictions of certain fighting
words for being particularly likely to incite violence or certain brands of obscenity
for being particularly lewd. It cannot, however, impose restrictions based on
viewpoint, e.g. a ban on only racist fighting words, regardless of how disfavored
the viewpoint is. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2732
(2011) (invalidating a California statute banning the sale of violent video games
on the grounds that it was “wildly underinclusive, raising serious doubts about
whether the State is pursuing the interest it invokes or is instead disfavoring a
particular speaker or viewpoint”). See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1217 (2011) (articulating that even highly offensive speech concerning general or
public issues—here, signs containing messages such as “You’re Going to Hell”
and “God Hates You”—deserves full First Amendment protection).
47 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (“Virginia’s statute does not
run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to
intimidate. Unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward ’one of the specified disfavored topics.’ It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion, or because of
the victim’s ‘political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.’”) (quoting
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391).
48 See Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (highlighting cross burning as a long-standing
symbol of imminent violence).
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the First Amendment, and (2) represents a particularly virulent
strain of the kind of speech in that unprotected category. The
Court’s two-step analysis constitutes a very precise basis for hate
speech regulation. And as the Court has not deemed many
categories of speech unprotected under the First Amendment,49
this foundation is also very speech-protective.
Ultimately,
however, if the international community’s goal for hate speech
regulation is to value both the speaker’s right to express a
viewpoint and the listener’s right to remain free from
discrimination, then adopting the R.A.V.-Black framework in its
entirety is an incomplete solution.50
As the following Part explains, the international community
gives considerable weight to the non-violent yet harmful import of
hate speech. Though this priority is a noble backdrop for
regulation, it holds perhaps too much potential for overregulation.
Thus, the international standard for hate speech regulation may
benefit from internalizing the precision, if not the near-absolute
protection of individual speech rights, of the American
framework.51
3.

CURRENT TREATMENT OF HATE SPEECH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

International human rights instruments codify the rights to
both freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination.
Accordingly, the relationship between the rights of the speaker and
the listener plays a larger role in protecting individual speech
under the international approach than it does under the U.S.
approach.52 The ICCPR, among many conventions and treaties,
See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying texts.
See Webb, supra note 30, at 446 (noting that, under the current American
standard for hate speech regulation, “hate speech cannot be criminalized when it
is simply encouraging hatred, which can be as harmful as expressly inciting violence or threatening others”).
51 See Massaro, supra note 29, at 243 (outlining drawbacks to the international
approach to hate speech regulation by highlighting the “contested interpretation
of equality” and noting that the role of government is not to “take a side in intergroup hostilities, [albeit] if only to even the score,” but “to remain neutral when
policing intergroup conflicts”).
52 See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 29(2) (“In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”); Scott J. Catlin, A Proposal
49
50
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addresses this balance.53
Prosecutor v. Nahimana and other
landmark decisions demonstrate, however, that in a herculean
effort to strengthen two often competing fundamental human
rights, the international community is no closer to articulating a
consistent standard for prosecuting hate speech.54
3.1. An Interplay of Rights: Freedom of Expression and Freedom from
Discrimination as Codified in International Human Rights
Instruments
Many international legal instruments explicitly designate the
right to free expression as a fundamental human right that is
worthy of protection. Article 19 of both the UDHR and the ICCPR
highlights the “right to hold opinions without interference”55 as
well as the right to receive a wide breadth of information through
any media.56 Article 13 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) further protects a child’s freedom to “seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”57 In addition,
Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) requires state parties to

for Regulating Hate Speech in the United States: Balancing Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 771, 795 (1993–
1994) (emphasizing that the fundamental tenets of international human rights
agreements “require a balancing of the speaker’s right to free speech against the
listener’s right to have her inherent human dignity protected from hate speech
injuries”); Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response
to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 57, 71 (1992–1993) (“The rights of equality and
non-discrimination are central in the Universal Declaration and no rights, including speech rights, may be asserted to destroy them.”).
53 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at arts. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression”) and 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.”).
54 See generally Alexander Zahar, The ICTR’s “Media” Judgment and the Reinvention of Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, 16 CRIM. L.F. 33, 47–48
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348507 (arguing that the Media
judgment failed to articulate solid reasons as to why the broadcasted and written
statements are at issue, despite publicly preaching hate, constituted direct and
public incitement to genocide).
55 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(1); UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 19.
56 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(2); UDHR, supra note 11, at art. 19.
57 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 13, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3.
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criminalize “all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred, [and] incitement to racial discrimination.”58
These instruments also support the notion that the right to free
expression does not stand alone. Rather, it is measured in relation
to other fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom
from discrimination. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR indicates that
freedom of expression is contingent on the fulfillment of “special
duties and responsibilities” and may be restricted on grounds of,
most notably, “respect of the rights . . . of others.”59 This
qualification is a reflection of the preambles to both the UDHR and
ICCPR, which emphasize the importance of recognizing and
maintaining basic dignity and equality among all individuals.60 In
addition, Article 26 of the ICCPR states that “all persons are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law.”61
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR addresses hate speech directly,
stating that all “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall
be prohibited by law.”62 Although it invokes the incitement
language of Brandenburg and Dennis, Article 20 broadens the range
of proscribable speech based on content to include not only speech
that incites violence, but also speech that incites discrimination and
hostility.63 Further, the ICCPR obligates state parties to adopt laws
against this kind of speech. This provision is outlined in Article 2:

58 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4(a), Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
59 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19(3) (emphasis added).
60 See id. pmbl. (“[r]ealizing that the individual [has] duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs . . . .”); UDHR, supra note 11, pmbl.
(“[T]he peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in
. . . the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and
women . . . .”).
61 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 26 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at art. 20(2).
63 See Catlin, supra note 52, at 799 (detailing Article 20’s broad reach in its
prohibition of incitement to discrimination and hostility, and indicating that this
feature of the international approach is most at odds with the American approach
to regulating hate speech); see generally David Filvaroff et al., The Substantive Rights
and United States Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 54 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993).
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Where not already provided for by existing legislative or
other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.64
The ICCPR’s provision regarding incitement to hostility and
discrimination are not sufficiently speech-protective to square with
the American standard.65 As a result, the United States made
reservations to its ratification of the ICCPR. In order to maintain
ultimate discretion with regard to speech regulation, the U.S.
Senate declared the ICCPR a non-self-executing treaty, or one that
American courts cannot directly enforce until Congress and the
Executive Branch pass appropriate legislation.66
3.2. Regulating Hate Speech in the Context of Incitement to Genocide
in Rwanda: A Reminder of the Dangers of Unchecked Expression
Unlike in other contexts in international law, hate speech
regulation in the context of genocide is similar to the American
system of regulating incitement. In its 2003 Prosecutor v. Nahimana
decision following the Rwandan genocide, the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) adopted a precise standard
for prosecuting hate speech that incorporated many of the speechprotective elements that compose the current American standard
for regulation of incitement.67 In that case, the ICTR was right to be
speech protective; it exercised its power to convict an individual
for a genocide-related crime based solely on the transmission of
hateful speech with appropriate caution. Uniquely, the ICTR was

ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 2.
See Catlin, supra note 52, at 799 (noting that the international approach, due
to its broader parameters, necessitates more content-based regulations, many of
which might be impermissible under the American standard for hate speech regulation).
66 See id. at 802 (emphasizing the “dichotomous approach to the implementation of [the United States’] international human rights agreements” and stressing
that although the United States maintains a commitment internationally to the
tenets of such agreements, it “reserves the option to only partially implement
them domestically”).
67 See infra notes 82–90 and accompanying texts.
64
65
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also able to underscore the value that international law places on
the right to non-discrimination by ultimately convicting three
principal figures in the Rwandan media for incitement to
genocide.68 This result also fits; restricting speech that incites
genocide—that is, prioritizing the right to freedom from
discrimination when that discrimination takes the form of ethnic
cleansing—is legitimate, if only to deter future occurrences.
However, Nahimana and related post-genocide decisions stand
separately. Genocide is a horror of such magnitude that it
validates arguments on both sides of speech regulation.69 In less
dire cases, it is more difficult to equally prioritize the rights to
freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination. Courts
around the world have thus shown varying degrees of prudence
when proscribing hate speech. Nonetheless, it is helpful to
examine the ICTR’s decisions for their analytical clarity and
illumination of the power of hate speech and the worst
consequences of allowing absolute freedom of expression.
3.2.1. Background of the Rwandan Genocide
Current President of the International Association of Genocide
Scholars, Professor William A. Schabas, wrote: the “road to
genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech.”70 Beginning in
the 1930s and spurred by Belgian colonialism, the ethnic divide
between the Hutu and Tutsi races in Rwanda hardened over six
decades leading to the 1994 genocide whose 100-day span oversaw
the massacre of over one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.71
In 1993, Hutu extremists established a radio station called
Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM),72 which was
See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying texts.
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 325, 330 (2004) (“The ICTR’s pathbreaking ruling shows that
equality and speech rights can be harmonized when courts face the power of media to kill.”).
70 William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL
L.J. 141, 144 (2000).
71 See Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide?
An Estimate, 6 J. GENOCIDE RES. 85 (2004).
72 See Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA
AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 41, 44 (Allan Thompson ed., 2007) (detailing the
harmless beginnings of RTLM and emphasizing that the “station was meant to be
the voice of the people . . . ”).
68
69

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss4/9

CHANDRAMOULI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

HATE SPEECH REGULATION

10/29/2013 6:36 PM

845

supported by the government-controlled Radio Rwanda, to
broadcast messages of hate. Prior to the creation of RTLM and the
start of the Tutsi extermination, the French-language tabloid
Kangura,73 whose primary demographic was the illiterate Hutu
population, advocated the killing of Tutsis.74 Fear-mongering
through threats and rumors played a significant role in inciting
hatred of Tutsis in the local population.75
The prevalence of hate media intensified following the death of
Rwandan President Habyarimana in 1994. RTLM broadcasts
incited Hutus to eliminate the inyenzi or “cockroach,”76 which
became a euphemism for the Tutsi people during the genocide.77
Despite the damaging effects of hate media in Rwanda, the United
States declined intervention, reasoning in part that shutting down
the broadcast of these hateful messages would impermissibly
interfere with the sovereignty of the Rwandan government and
would bear an uncomfortable resemblance to censorship.78

73 See Zahar, supra note 54, at 45 (characterizing Kangura as “a Hutunationalist rag, hateful of the [Tutsi-created Rwandan Patriotic Front or] RPF and
the threat it posed to what Ngeze saw as the glorious Hutu revolution of 1959,
when the masses threw off the Tutsi yoke, founded the Republic, regained their
dignity, and set Rwanda on the path to modernity”).
74 Id. (indicating that Kangura aimed its advocacy towards illiterate Rwandans).
75 See Des Forges, supra note 72, at 45 (documenting the RTLM’s turn to sensationalism in 1993 and its twin aims of “underlin[ing] supposed Tutsi brutality
and heighten[ing] Hutu fears of Tutsi”).
76 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, iv (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
refworld/rwmain?docid=404468bc2, (defining inyenzi as: “[c]ockroach; group of
refugees set up in 1959 to overthrow the new regime; sympathizer of RPF; sometimes used to refer to Tutsi”).
77 See Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, Judgement and Sentence,
¶ 44 (June 1, 2000), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%
5CEnglish%5CRuggiu%5Cjudgement%5Crug010600.pdf (convicting Georges
Ruggiu, a Belgian broadcaster who pled guilty to committing incitement to genocide in Rwanda and who admitted that by 1994 “the term ‘Inyenzi’ [had become]
synonymous with the term ‘Tutsi’ . . . [and had come] to designate the Tutsis as
‘persons to be killed’”).
78 See Gregory H. Stanton, The Rwandan Genocide: Why Early Warning Failed, 1
J. AFR. CONFLICTS AND PEACE STUD. 6, 9 (2012), available at http:// scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=jacaps (indicating that
the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, and the State Department defended RTLM’s right to broadcast as freedom of speech) (internal quotations
omitted).
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3.2.2. Prosecuting Hate in the Aftermath of the Genocide
The Nahimana decision marked “international criminal law’s
first reexamination of the link between mass media and mass
slaughter” since the Nuremburg Trials.79 In that case, the ICTR
addressed the accountability of Rwandan hate media outlets in the
genocide. The Trial Chamber found three Rwandan journalists of
radio and print media, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, and Hassan Ngeze, guilty of several counts under
the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (“Genocide Convention”), including direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.80 These convictions on the
count of incitement to commit genocide81 indicate that hate speech
can be sufficient to constitute one of international law’s most
atrocious crimes.82
The ICTR previously addressed the crime of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide in its 1998 decision, Prosecutor v.
Jean-Paul Akayesu.83 This decision considers the implications of the
terms ‘public’ and ‘direct,’ as well as the mens rea required to incur

79 Recent Case, International Law — Genocide — U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass
Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against
Humanity. — Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (Media Case), Case No.
ICTR-99-52-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003), 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 2769 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Case: The Media Case].
80 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 1091-1094 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=404468bc2.
81 Note that in its 2007 decision, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the convictions of Nahimana and Ngeze for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement
(Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/
Court%20Documents/ICTR/Nahimana%20et%20al_Appeal%20Judgment.pdf
(supporting the Trial Chamber’s distinction between general hate speech and incitement to commit genocide, id. ¶ 715, and upholding the Trial Chamber’s convictions of Nahimana and Ngeze for direct and public incitement to commit genocide, id. ¶¶ 1051, 1113).
82 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 328-29 (“The Media Case is notable for
holding a newspaper editor and a broadcast executive criminally accountable not
only for the crime of what they said, but for the crimes their words did . . . .”).
83 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998),
available
at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement
%5Cakay001.pdf.
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criminal liability.84 ‘Public’ refers to a “call for criminal action to a
number of individuals” by means of a speech, public threats, radio
and television broadcasts, or communication through other mass
media.85 ‘Direct’ refers to incitement that is specifically intended to
elicit a response, in contrast with “vague or indirect suggestion.”86
In order for the incitement to be direct, the target audience must
also be objectively likely to act on it. In other words, the audience
must understand the speech at issue, and the speech must be
persuasive.87 Both Akayesu and the Nahimana appeal indicate that
the presence of genocidal intent88 alone is sufficient to constitute a
crime, regardless of whether the speech at issue successfully
triggered genocide.89
The Akayesu analysis resembles the standard for proscribing
hate speech that constitutes incitement under current U.S. law.90
Similarly, the ICTR’s evaluation in Nahimana aligns with that of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg and Dennis. Through an
examination of the specificity and tone of the hate speech at issue
and the context of its dissemination, the Tribunal sought to
determine whether the speech actively advocated violence or

84 See id. ¶¶ 556-60 (outlining the factors considered in identifying incitement
to be public or direct and stating that the required mens rea lies in the specific intent “to directly prompt or provoke another to commit genocide”).
85 Id. ¶ 556 (citing the International Law Commission’s definition of public
incitement).
86 Id. ¶ 557.
87 See id. ¶¶ 557-58 (“The Chamber will . . . consider on a case-by-case basis
whether, in light of the culture of Rwanda . . . acts of incitement can be viewed as
direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the persons for whom
the message was intended immediately grasped the implication thereof.”).
88 See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgement ¶
523 (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%
20Documents/ICTR/Nahimana%20et%20al_Appeal%20Judgment.pdf (citing the
definition of genocidal intent in Article 2(2) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”) (internal quotations omitted).
89 See id. ¶ 678 (emphasizing that “the drafters of the [Genocide] Convention
intended to punish direct and public incitement to commit genocide, even if no
act of genocide was committed, the aim being to forestall the occurrence of such
acts”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 561 (Sept. 2,
1998),
available
at
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%
5CAkayesu%5Cjudgement%5Cakay001.pdf.
90 See supra Part 2.1, notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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simply educated in the abstract.91 Although largely cabined to
circumstances as extreme as genocide, the reasoning in the
Nahimana decision is an influential example of precision in hate
speech regulation.92
3.3. An Inconsistent Treatment of Hate Speech in Recent
International Jurisprudence
As demonstrated by hate speech decisions and regulations in
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, the
international standard for hate speech regulation becomes less
consistent in the absence of an equalizing circumstance.
Depending on the country and its history and culture, the standard
vacillates between more and less speech-protection, closer to and
further from the American system.
3.3.1. Canada
Canada derives its commitment to combating hate speech in
part from Germany’s history and the dissemination of hateful
propaganda during the Holocaust.93 For example, in marked
opposition to the American system of speech regulation, the
Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Keegstra94 sustained the
conviction of a teacher charged with making anti-Semitic
comments to his students.95 In that case, the teacher was convicted
under a statute that criminalizes the “promotion of hatred . . .
towards any section of the public distinguished by color, race,
religion or ethnic origin.”96
The statute does not mention
91 See Recent Case: The Media Case, supra note 79, at 2772 (emphasizing the Tribunal’s consideration of context when determining whether the speech at issue
“was intended to promote an offense or merely to educate persuasively”).
92 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 330 (“The strong but subtle principles articulated in The Media Case, applicable to many legal areas of speech regulation,
will have an impact around the world, not least in countries that have tended to
see themselves as exempt from horrors of Rwanda’s gravity.”).
93 See Kübler, supra note 6, at 337 (“[T]he German example has inspired legislation in other countries. The Canadian Rules, for example, have been . . . based
on the premise that the successes of modern advertising, the triumph of impudent
propaganda such as Hitler’s, have qualified sharply [the] belief in the rationality
of man.”) (internal quotations omitted).
94 R. v. Keegstra, [1990)] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
95 See id. at 698.
96 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 319(2) (Can.).
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incitement to violence and is similar to the statute in R.A.V., which
the U.S. Supreme Court deemed overbroad.97 However, the
Canadian Supreme Court concluded that although the statute
appears to violate the principles of Section 2(b) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,98 it is constitutional under Section
1 of the Charter.99
The Court’s reasoning in Keegstra is based on principles of
This
“individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing.”100
language resembles First Amendment ideals of the search for truth,
tolerance of diversity, and the preservation of robust public
debate.101 However, the Canadian view is that these ideals are best
achieved by prioritizing individual dignity and social harmony.102
The dissemination of hate speech undermines these priorities.
3.3.2. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom does not have a consistent framework for
hate speech regulation. Historically, sustaining a conviction on a
count of seditious libel, for example, required a showing of
intent.103 The Race Relations Act of 1965,104 although broad in its
definition of incitement, included a similar requirement, which

See supra notes 10, 43-46 and accompanying texts.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), at Sec. 2(b) (protecting
“freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the
press and other media of communication”).
99 Id. § 1 (“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”) (emphasis
added).
100 See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 728 (citing the Canadian Charter).
101 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying texts.
102 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1544 (underscoring that under the Canadian
hate speech regulation standard, the transmission of hate speech is “more dangerous than its suppression as it is seen as likely to produce enduring injuries to selfworth and to undermine social cohesion in the long run”).
103 See Stanley Halpin, Racial Hate Speech: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact
of International Human Rights Law upon the Law of the United Kingdom and the United
States, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 463, 467-68 (2010-2011) (detailing past seditious libel laws
in the United Kingdom that required “the element of intentional promotion of actual violence to be present”).
104 RACE RELATIONS ACT, 1965, c. 73, § 6 (1) (Eng.).
97
98
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made it difficult to prosecute hate speech.105 Over the years, a
number of statutory provisions have emerged, broadening the
United Kingdom’s commitment to restricting hate speech. In 1986,
hate speech amounting to harassment of a group became
punishable under the Section 5 of the Public Order Act.106 The
enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act followed in
1997.107 In 2006, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act made it a
criminal offense in England and Wales to publish, broadcast, or
otherwise disseminate hate speech targeting religious groups.108
The overall effectiveness of these statutes, however, remains
unclear.109 As a general matter, the judicial system does not appear
to favor hate speech prosecutions, particularly when that speech is
unlikely to incite actual violence.110 In addition, although there is a
relatively high incidence of reporting hate speech crimes, a large
number of prosecutions are dropped.111
3.3.3. Germany
Germany maintains a particularly strong commitment to
regulating hate speech due to the virulent strain of hate
propaganda perpetuated by the Nazis that led, ultimately, to the
Holocaust. As in Canada, German courts view the right to selfexpression as part of a broader bundle of individual rights and

105 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1546 (noting that although the Race Relations Act of 1965 centered on “incitement to hatred rather than . . . incitement to
violence,” it did have an intent requirement) (emphasis added). Note that the
Race Relations Act of 1965 was amended by the Race Relations Act of 1976, and
the intent requirement was dropped.
106 PUBLIC ORDER ACT, 1986, c. 64, §§ 5-6 (Eng.).
107 PROTECTION FROM HARASSMENT ACT, 1997, c. 40, § 7 (Eng.).
108 RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED ACT, 2006 (Eng.).
109 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1547 (arguing that the statutes discussed
“provide more tools in the British legal arsenal against hate speech, but have not
thus far led to any clearer or more definitive indication of the ultimate boundaries
of punishable hate speech in the United Kingdom”).
110 See Halpin, supra note 103, at 469 (tracing the declining number of hate
speech prosecutions in the United Kingdom).
111 See id. at 473 (citing MGMT. INFO. BRANCH, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV.,
RACIST AND RELIGIOUS INCIDENT MONITORING (2007) to illustrate the high percentages of dropped prosecutions and the “few violations of the 1998 Hate Crime Act
[that are] identified as accepted for prosecution”).
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duties to the community.112 Today, the German government may
impose criminal liability for speech that inflicts harm on human
dignity or targets particular minority groups, based on their
religious or ethnic origins.113 Furthermore, in contrast to the
American standard for hate speech regulation, the requirement
that hate speech must meet an incitement threshold is absent or
very minimal under the German standard.114
3.3.4. Australia
In Australia, unlike in other countries, the right to free
expression is a strictly common law notion.115 As a result, every
state has its own set of restrictions on discriminatory or derogatory
speech.116 These state regulations and federal law117 appear to
specifically target victimization based on race, and the most
common avenues of redress are civil penalties. The Australian
government rarely enforces the few criminal hate speech
regulations that currently exist.118 One reason for this may be that
the focus on civil remedies represents a more comprehensive
system of regulation, as criminal statutes are typically more
narrowly construed.119
Even in the absence of a codified right to free speech, however,
Australian courts have sought to uphold speech rights. To

112 See Rosenfeld, supra note 5, at 1549-50 (delineating Germany’s commitment to preserving the balance “between the self-expression needs of speakers
and the self-respect and dignity of listeners”).
113 See id. at 1551 (explaining that the German government has a wide variety
of legal tools it uses to combat hate speech).
114 See id. at 1551-52 (outlining the lower standards of proof that are required
in Germany, with specific reference to prohibitions on denials regarding the Holocaust).
115 Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Landscape, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA 2, 4-5 (Katharine Gelber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007) (contrasting the implied right to free speech in
Australia with the explicit right to free speech in other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom).
116 See id. at 5 (listing Australia’s various anti-discrimination laws by jurisdiction).
117 See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 18C (Austl.) (prohibiting offensive behavior likely to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person”
because of “race, colour or national or ethnic origin”).
118 See Gelber, supra note 115, at 8-9.
119 See id. at 9-10.
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accomplish this, they have both opposed and relied on
international legal principles. In the 2003 decision Hagan v.
Australia, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (“Committee”) recommended the removal of a sign
containing a racial slur from a stadium.120 In that case, stadium
management refused, and the Australian government did nothing
to ensure compliance with the Committee’s recommendation.121 In
a similar validation of free speech principles, the Australian High
Court in Coleman v. Power122 set aside a conviction under the
Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act123 for the use of “any
threatening, abusive, or insulting words to any person.”124
Although the majority relied primarily on the Australian
constitution to enforce free speech obligations, Justice Kirby’s
concurrence relied on international law,125 specifically Article 19 of
the ICCPR.126
4.

LOOKING TO THE CURRENT STATE OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH A MORE PRECISE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARD

The U.S. Supreme Court has restricted hate speech based on its
content only in cases where that speech falls into a category that
has been previously deemed unprotected under the First
Amendment.127 Thus, the reasoning that the Court has used to
analyze government regulation of incitement,128 fighting words,129
120 Hagan v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Elim. of Racial Discrim. Comm., 62d
Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003).
121 Mello, supra note 6, at 367 (citing AAP, UN Racism Ruling Ignored, THE
MERCURY (Austl.), July 12, 2003, at 15).
122 Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 35 (Austl.).
123 Vagrants, Gaming, and Other Offences Act of 1931 (Qld.) (Austl.).
124 Id. § 7(d) (“Any person who, in any public place . . . (d) [u]ses any threatening, abusive, or insulting words to any person . . . shall be liable.”).
125 See Coleman, 220 CLR at 82 (Kirby, J., concurring) (emphasizing the value
of considering treaties and principles in international law when resolving domestic disputes).
126 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 19 (protecting the right to political expression).
127 See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying texts (listing primary categories
the Court recognizes).
128 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that incitement
means “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and “likely to
incite or produce such action”).
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and threats130 underlies the Court’s approach to hate speech
regulation. The principle underlying this precision is speech
protection. First Amendment jurisprudence has limited speech
restriction primarily to speech that is closely associated with acts of
violence. On the international stage, however, the right to speak is
qualified in a more significant way by the non-violent effects of
that speech.
Nonetheless, the international community could benefit from
emulating, in part, the precision of the American system. As this
Comment suggests, the international community places value on
freedom from discrimination; however, the magnitude of that
value varies across cases and countries. In the case of the
Rwandan genocide, for example, that value increased dramatically,
as discrimination led directly to mass violence. However, in cases
such as Keegstra or Hagan, where the discriminatory speech is
hateful but not ostensibly harmful, the line becomes difficult to
draw.
To begin the process of streamlining the international system of
hate speech regulation, it may be useful to incorporate a detailed
imminent violence requirement.131 Although the ICCPR prohibits
speech that incites “discrimination, hostility or violence,” there are
few parameters around the proximity of causation.132 In an age of
instant transcontinental access, the international community must
more specifically outline the role of timing between the speech and
its violent or discriminatory effects through regulation.133

129 See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (providing the definition
for “fighting words” as words that, when spoken, “inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace”).
130 See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating the Court defines a
true threat as a statement made with the foreseeable expectation to be understood
as conveying an intent to harm); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding
cross burning can be banned under the Fourth Amendment if done with intent to
intimidate).
131 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (requiring imminent action in its two
prong test).
132 See ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 20(2) (relating to only “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred”).
133 See MacKinnon, supra note 69, at 330 (noting that the Nahimana decision
“will be carefully studied, including in cases in which incited events have yet to
happen or occur at far remove from the inciting words”) (emphasis added).
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Another notion that has not yet been incorporated into
international hate speech regulation involves the portion of the
Dennis holding that the Brandenburg majority did not overrule. The
Dennis decision focuses on the issue of how to treat active
advocacy, or the indoctrination of members of a group to commit
acts of violence, when imminence is not a factor.134 The open
question is, in other words:
if an individual is actively
advocating—as distinguished from teaching abstractly on a topic
such as overthrowing the government135—acts of violence through
hate speech, but there is no immediate plan to carry out such acts,
can that individual be prosecuted for disseminating hate?
This concern is especially relevant in cases of terrorist groups
whose existence is premised exclusively on the commission of acts
of violence.136 In these cases, although the U.S. Supreme Court has
held against prosecution based solely on membership, evidence
that a member is actively advocating violence through hate speech
may be sufficient for prosecution, even if that violence is not
imminent in the way that the Brandenburg standard prescribes.
Accordingly, in the 2010 decision Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,137 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a materialsupport statute, which makes it a crime to “knowingly provide[]
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempt[] or conspire[] to do so.”138 The Court concluded that
knowingly providing support to a terrorist organization, even

134 See Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (detailing that the indictment in
this case was for “wilfully [sic] and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize . . . a society, group and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and
destruction of the Government . . . by force and violence, and (2) . . . to advocate
and teach the duty and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the Government
. . . by force and violence,” which constitute violations of Sections 2 and 3 of the
Smith Act).
135 See id. at 511 (citing the lower court’s distinction that in order for advocacy
to be considered active, it must be “reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
persons to such action”).
136 See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA 71–73 (2002) (detailing the extensive training of members of Al Qaeda, including instruction in the use of explosives and hand-to-hand combat as well as psychological preparedness with
regard to suicide missions and the maintenance of religious zeal).
137 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
138 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (2009).
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without specific intent to further terrorist activity, is sufficient for
prosecution.139
The Holder decision adds depth to the portion of the Dennis
holding that Brandenburg did not overturn. The Court clarified that
its decision in Holder does not constitute a reversal in precedent
regarding an individual’s freedom of association under the First
Amendment. On the other hand, the Court emphasized that §
2339B “does not penalize mere association, but prohibits the act of
giving foreign terrorist groups material support.”140 Further, the
Holder decision does not prevent writing or speaking about
terrorist organizations, or even adopting membership.141 As Holder
involved an as-applied challenge, the Court did not consider the
far-reaching implications of allowing § 2339B to pass constitutional
muster, thus overlooking, at least in part, the intent and imminence
requirements that are central to Brandenburg. However, Holder
remains an indication of flexibility and awareness of context—to
which the international legal community at times affords undue
weight at the expense of self-expression142—within the
comparatively rigid Brandenburg paradigm.
In the international legal community, the Holder decision and
the portion of the Dennis holding that this comment discusses are
especially valuable when balancing speech rights—which
Brandenburg’s intent and imminence requirements favor—with
their effects on the community. In Holder, for example, the Court
deferred to legislative findings concerning “the sensitive interests
in national security and foreign affairs.”143 Accordingly, the Court
found it foreseeable that materially supporting an organization
whose existence is premised on terrorist activity will aid broader
terrorist activity, even if the intent and imminence requirements of
Brandenburg are not directly fulfilled.144
Ultimately, the

Holder, supra note 137, at 2708–09.
Id. at 2711.
141 Id. at 2723.
142 See Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: Crimalising Incitement to Violence, (2005) 28
U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 868, 886 (“[E]xtending the law of incitement through
new sedition offences and the power to proscribe organizations is a hasty and imprudent overreaction which inevitably criminalises valuable contributions to public discussion.”).
143 Holder, supra note 137, at 2711.
144 Id.
139
140
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incorporation of an imminent violence requirement and further
specificity regarding speech regulation in cases where hate speech
is used to indoctrinate violent groups are essential to achieving a
more consistent system of hate speech regulation in international
law.
5.

CONCLUSION

In a time, more than any other, of instant access, the power of
rhetoric is at its height. Extremist and fanatical groups disseminate
hate relentlessly across all media, appealing to emotional and
psychological vulnerabilities and laying an insidious groundwork
of discrimination and violence. On the international stage, the
issue is whether the law should respond to these messages of
hate—many of them untargeted or targeted at large groups over
individuals.
Europe and the UN have undertaken measures to criminalize
general incitement to terrorism.145 In 2005, for example, the
Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism, which mandates State parties to criminalize “public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence.”146 In this context,
public provocation is defined as “the distribution . . . of a message
to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist
offence, where such conduct . . . causes a danger that one or more
such offences may be committed.”147 As a general matter, these
broader criminal provisions, which would likely not pass muster
under Brandenburg, appear to target “an environment and
psychological climate conducive to criminal activity,”148 unrelated
to a specific intent to harm or offend. Though First Amendment
jurisprudence in the United States does not favor content-based
speech restrictions except in the most well-defined contexts,

145 See Saul, supra note 142, at 868–69 (“Internationally, pressure to criminalise generalised incitement to terrorism has emanated from Europe and the United
Nations.”).
146 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, opened for
signature May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 6907.
147 Id.
148 Mordechai Kremnitzer and Khalid Ghanayim, Incitement, Not Sedition, in
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 147, 197 (David
Kretzmer and Francine Hazan, eds. 2000).
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current political and social tensions may demand more oversight
from international law.
Conversely, against this backdrop of increasing unrest and
media influence, it is more important than ever to maintain the
distinction between vigilance and suppression. In his book
Defending My Enemy: American Nazis, the Skokie Case, and the Risks
of Freedom, Aryeh Neier wrote, “To defend myself, I must restrain
power with freedom, even if the temporary beneficiaries are the
enemies of freedom.”149 This sentiment is the prevailing notion
among protectors of speech rights—that hateful speech is best
countered with more speech, allowing for an atmosphere of robust
public debate and fueling innovation, human capital and economic
development, and social change. To this end, organizations such
as Human Rights Watch have determined that restricting hate
speech does not necessarily further equality.150 In addition, in
countries such as Sri Lanka and South Africa, hate speech
restrictions are enforced haphazardly and to the detriment of the
least privileged communities.151 However, in an era where speech
is increasingly powerful, especially in the hands of groups whose
sole aims are violence and destruction, it is important to continue
to refine this ideal to keep pace with the changing nature of
society.
International law has always recognized the inalienable rights
to human dignity and freedom from discrimination; however, its
efforts to protect these rights without devaluing other fundamental
rights are inconsistent at best. In order to strengthen the global
commitment to non-discrimination, the international community
must clarify its standard for hate speech regulation. To do this, it
must adopt the precision of the American speech-protective lens—
a lens that declared a Birmingham parade ordinance an
unconstitutional infringement on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
149 ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE
AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 5 (E.P. Dutton Univ. Press 1979).

SKOKIE CASE,

150 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ‘Hate Speech’ and Freedom of Expression, A HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH POLICY PAPER, Mar. 1992, at 4 (indicating that there is “little connection in practice between draconian ‘hate speech’ laws and the lessening of ethnic
and racial violence or tension”).
151 Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, in STRIKING A BALANCE:
HATE SPEECH, FREE SPEECH, AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 373-74 (Sandra Coliver ed.,
1992) (calling hate speech laws into question for being “vehicles for persecution of
critics” and for “[compromising] the right of dissent”).
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right to civil protest in 1969.152 A more coherent system of hate
speech regulation in the international community will help to
strengthen the relationship between free speech and freedom from
discrimination for speakers and their audiences. And both sides of
the conversation will be clearer.

152 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting any public demonstration without a permit that will be
granted or withheld at the sole discretion of an official is an unconstitutional censorship of First Amendment rights).
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